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INSTITUTIONALIZING CONSENT MYTHS IN GRADE SCHOOL 
 
Shawn E. Fields∗ 
 
Scholars and advocates have long decried antiquated notions of 
consent in the criminal law of rape and sexual assault. Significant 
progress has been made to redefine consent in criminal codes and in our 
collective consciousness as freely given, informed, enthusiastic, explicit, 
revocable, and to be considered from the perspective of the consenting 
party. But despite this progress, the criminal justice apparatus continues 
to fixate on details irrelevant to the consent calculus such as the victim’s 
dress. This obsession with the victim’s clothing reflects a troubling 
willingness to imply consent or, alternatively, blame the victim for 
provocatively “asking for it.” Significant scholarship has demonstrated 
the corrosive impact of this fixation, resulting in a “credibility discount” 
of women making sexual violence allegations, the acquittal of defendants 
engaged in clearly criminal sexual conduct, and a concomitant reluctance 
of female victims of sexual violence to engage with the justice system.  
None of the foregoing is new or particularly controversial. But while 
this unfortunate reality has been well examined, this Essay reflects upon a 
lesser explored, early root cause of the status quo: the hard wiring of 
consent myths in grade school through gendered dress codes and the 
gendered messaging these dress codes institutionalize about consent. 
Increasingly pervasive, increasingly sex obsessed dress codes feed 
narratives at an early age that girls are sexual objects who are responsible 
for the assaultive behavior of perpetrators and who “ask for” any 
unwanted sexual attention their dress may attract. 
This Essay highlights the dangerous, highly sexualized justification 
often given by school administrators for gendered dress codes: a desire to 
create a “distraction-free learning environment” for boys. This messaging 
sexualizes underage girls, forces them to become hyper-cognizant about 
their physical identity, and signals a male entitlement to act 
inappropriately towards the female body for which the female will be 
punished. At root, these dress codes, and the justifications behind them, 
normalize and excuse sexually predatory behavior as a natural 
“distracted” reaction while blaming the victim for provoking the 
unwanted behavior. This institutionalization – which continues to grow – 
naturally feeds corrosive narratives that persist in criminal sexual assault 
 
∗ Assistant Professor of Law, Campbell University School of Law; J.D., Boston University 
School of Law; B.A., Yale University. Thank you to Professor Erin Sheley for the invitation 
to participate in this symposium, to the editors and staff of the Oklahoma Law Review for 
drawing attention to this important issue, and to Professors Noël Harlow and Tony Ghiotto 
for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this Essay. 
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adjudications, including implied consent, the requirement of a “perfect 
victim,” and the myth of the “unstoppable male.”   
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2015, a dress code policy at Woodford County High School in Versailles, 
Kentucky received national media attention when a student who appeared to be 
dressed appropriately was nevertheless sent home because her collarbone was 
exposed.1 A photo of the student wearing the outfit in question soon went viral on 
the internet and led to confusion about the nature of her offense.2 According to the 
school, her clothing did amount to a technical violation of it’s facially gender neutral 
dress code, which prohibited “skirts and shorts that fall above the knee and shirts 
that extend below the collarbone.”3  
 
 
 
1 Ashley Lewis, “Kentucky high school students, parents fight strict dress code that requires 
girls to cover collarbone,” N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 17, 2015), available at 
https://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/female-student-reprimanded-showing-
collarbone-article-1.2328582. 
2 Id. (“The angry parent posted a picture of the offending outfit – a crème tank top with a 
white cardigan – which was shared nearly 40,000 times.”). 
3 Esther Crain, “Teen’s Exposed Collarbone Sets Off Dress Code Controversy,” YAHOO! 
NEWS (Aug. 18, 2015). 
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The rationale behind the dress code and the enforcement of this technical 
violation – “that certain articles of girls’ attire should be prohibited because they 
‘distract’ boys” – led students at the school to take action.4 After finding that “girls 
were disciplined disproportionately,” and were unilaterally singled out for causing a 
distraction to the opposite sex, several students led an online campaign to protest 
what they viewed as sexist dress codes.5 “Many of these protests have criticized the 
dress codes as sexist in that they unfairly target girls by body-shaming and blaming 
them for promoting sexual harassment.”6 
This episode illustrates the many ways so-called “modesty-based dress codes”7 
institutionalize myths about sex and consent. Dress codes disproportionately target 
and affect girls for their inherently dangerous and distracting bodies.8 They 
sexualize minor female bodies, place the onus on girls to take steps to prevent being 
objectified, and then places blame on girls for the sexually predatory actions of 
others.9 They excuse boys for improper conduct because they simply cannot resist 
certain temptations.10 And they reinforce the notion that girls who dress a certain 
way impliedly consent to otherwise unwanted behavior, and are less deserving of 
society’s protection. 
The problem is pervasive and growing. Written, mandatory dress codes exist in 
approximately sixty percent of the public schools in the United States, up from just 
 
4 Id. 
5 Id.; see also Rachael Krishna, “Young Women Are Protesting Against Dress Codes With 
#IAmMoreThanADistraction,” BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 4, 2015), available at 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/krishrach/young-women-are-protesting-against-
dress-codes-with-iammoret.  
6 Li Zhou, “Why School Dress Codes are Sexist,” THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 20, 2015), available 
at https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/10/school-dress-codes-are-
problematic/410962/.  
7 Deborah M. Ahrens & Andrew M. Siegel, Of Dress and Redress: Student Dress 
Restrictions in Constitutional Law and Culture, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 49, 76 (2019) 
(summarizing the harms of “imposing modesty-based dress restrictions on female students”). 
8 Meredith Johnson Harbach, School Discipline Policies: Sexualization, Sex Discrimination, 
and Public School Dress Codes, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 1039, 1043 (2016) (observing that 
“many dress cods are explicitly gender-specific . . . or are at least selectively enforced such 
that they impact female students disproportionately”); Jolie Lee, “Dress code crackdown: 
N.Y. school hands out 200 detentions,” USA TODAY (Sept. 15, 2014) (recalling the 
imposition of a new dress code at Tottenville High School in Staten Island, where “90% of 
the [dress code-related] detentions went to female students”).  
9 Harbach, supra note 8 at 1058 (placing gendered dress codes in “a broader cultural setting 
that too frequently sexualizes females and blames them for unwanted sexual attention”); 
Zhou, supra note 6 (“One of the key concerns is the implication that women should be 
hypercognizant about their physical identity and how the world responds to it.”); see also id. 
(quoting a female high school student, who claimed “My principal constantly says that the 
main reason for [it] is to create a ‘distraction-free’ learning zone’ for our male 
counterparts.”).  
10 See id. 
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under forty percent in 1990.11 Many of these dress codes explicitly set different 
standards for boys and girls, often requiring only girls to “prevent showing 
collarbones or shoulders,” prohibiting only girls from “showing underwear,” or 
prohibiting “the showing of cleavage or bra straps.”12 Many other facially neutral 
dress codes disproportionately affect girls, prohibiting spaghetti strap tank tops, 
shorts above the knee, or the showing of midriffs.13 Constitutional challenges to 
these dress codes have largely been unsuccessful, as courts have found legitimate 
justifications based on fostering a productive learning environment.14 But recent 
compelling evidence showing that dress code violating girls are disproportionately 
punished compared to their dress code violating male counterparts may offer a future 
avenue for these claims moving forward, particularly given the significant disruption 
to the educational experience by forcing a violator to remedy a dress code 
infringement.15 
Beyond litigation, this Essay draws on the obvious and troubling parallels 
between school dress code enforcement and criminal sexual assault adjudication to 
explore how seemingly innocuous modesty-based dress codes perpetuate a male-
centric system of implied consent and general entitlement to sexual conduct. By 
 
11 See Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7 at 102; Zhou, supra note 6; see also National Center 
for Education Statistics, “School Uniforms: Fast Facts,” IES NCES, available at 
https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=50 (“From 1999-2000 to 2015-16, the 
percentage of public schools reporting that they required students to wear uniforms increased 
from 12 to 21 percent.”). 
12 Judith Valente, “Kingsley Junior High Dress Code Targeting ‘Bra Straps, Cleavage’ 
Unleashes Backlash,” WGLT (Apr. 28, 2017), available at 
https://www.wglt.org/post/kingsley-junior-high-dress-code-targeting-bra-straps-cleavage-
unleashes-backlash#stream/0 (quoting message to parents from principal regarding dress 
code: “Shorts should cover students’ entire bottoms, there should be no bare shoulders, no 
visible bra straps and no midriff showing. Shirts that show excessive cleavage are also not 
appropriate for school.”). 
13 See Steve Nelson, “Dress Codes in Schools: Spaghetti Straps, Midriffs; Adults’ Need for 
Control,” HuffPost (Jun. 1, 2017), available at https://www.huffpost.com/entry/dress-codes-
in-schools.  
14 See, e.g., Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 392 (6th Cir. 2005) (rejecting 
First Amendment challenges to modesty-based dress codes, in part because teachers claimed 
the dress code “led to fewer ‘disruptions and distractions from students wearing revealing, 
distracting, and inappropriate clothing’”); Littlefield  v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 
275, 291 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[W]hile parents may have a fundamental right in the upbringing 
and education of their children, this right does not cover the parent’s objection to a public 
school Uniform Policy.”); see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578 (1975) (finding that 
issues of public education such as a school dress code are generally “committed to the control 
of state and local authorities”).  
15 For a discussion of the disproportionate impact of school dress code enforcement on girls, 
see generally infra, Section II. See also Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 
1994) (explaining that, under Title IX, “plaintiffs can show that a facially neutral practice 
has a disparate impact,” but defendants “may still prevail by proving a business or 
educational necessity for the practice”) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 
(1971)). 
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confronting the shocking ways children internalize myths about male sexual 
entitlement, morally inferior victims, and excusable predatory urges, perhaps needed 
change can take place more urgently both in the schoolhouse and the courthouse. 
 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SCHOOL DRESS CODES 
 
Formal school dress codes, including the adoption of school uniform policies, 
are a surprisingly recent phenomenon in American public schools.16 This section 
provides context for the evolution of dress code policies, from an informal system 
of heteronormative assimilation to increasingly formal authoritative attempts to 
address political protests, “countercultural” expressions, gang and other violence, 
and the purported rise of child sexualization. 
 
A. PRE-1960’S: INFORMALLY IMPOSED CULTURAL NORMS 
 
The United States has a largely unwritten history of public school dress norms 
and restrictions. “As best as scholars have been able to determine, dress norms and 
expectations were ubiquitous in American education up until the late 1960s, but 
formal dress codes were surprisingly rare and public school uniforms were almost--
perhaps entirely--unheard of.”17 Despite the persistent use of dress and appearance 
norms to stifle the cultural expression of minority groups and to foster assimilation 
throughout American society, little record exists of formal policies mandating such 
uniformity in public schools prior to the period of cultural upheaval defining the 
1960’s and 1970’s.18 
 
B. COUNTERCULTURE, VIETNAM, AND FREE EXPRESSION 
 
Child psychologists have long observed that the adolescent period marks an 
important moment for children to find individuality in their expressive selves, 
separate from the adults around them.19 For the “Baby Boom” generation, this group 
reached adolescence at roughly the same time the United States began fracturing 
along cultural and political lines, highlighted most prominently by the civil rights 
 
16 See Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7 at 99. 
17 Id. (“Styles and expectations for dress were typically set by students’ peers and the larger 
community, turned on material availability, reinforced gender and class norms, and reflected 
broader cultural values.”). 
18 See id.; see also Deanna J. Glickman, Fashioning Children: Gender Restrictive Dress 
Codes as an Entry Point for the Trans School to Prison Pipeline, 24 Am. U.J. Gender Soc. 
Pol’y & L. 263, 289 (2015); Jessica A. Clarke, They, Them, Theirs, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 894, 
925 (2019) (discussing adverse impacts of rise in gendered dress codes in 1960’s on trans 
and gender queer students). 
19 See Maria Piacentini & Greig Miller, Symbolic Consumption in Teenagers’ Clothing 
Choices, 3 J. Consumer 251, 262 (2004); Morris Rosenberg, SOCIETY AND THE ADOLESCENT 
SELF-IMAGE 24 (Princeton University Press 1965). 
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movement and the unpopular war in Vietnam.20 Not surprisingly, students in this 
period “adopted new clothing styles and grooming habits – chosen in part to 
intentionally differentiate themselves from older generations and established 
cultural norms.”21  
In response, representatives of those generations and norms pushed back, 
adopting increasingly formal and specific guidelines for student dress, hair length, 
and facial hair.22 These guidelines arose not from a concern about school safety or a 
desire to protect the sanctity of the learning environment, but from a fracturing of 
established norms and a stated desire to maintain assimilative notions of white, male, 
heteronormative, and inherently conservative uniformity.23  
This overt attempt to mandate such cultural uniformity was short lived. During 
a decade of litigation contesting these dress codes on First Amendment expression 
and substantive due process grounds, students won a string of victories in state and 
federal court recognizing the constitutional right of students to express themselves 
through their presentation and to retain a zone of autonomy in the dress and 
presentation choices they made.24 Reflecting the general attitude of courts at the time 
– an attitude that seems positively foreign in today’s educational climate – one 
California court expressed not only “great skepticism as to whether uniform policies 
were legal [but] great confusion as to why a district would feel the need or authority 
to adopt one.”25 
The most famous and enduring decision from this period, Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District,26 laid down the parameters still in use 
today for determining the constitutionality of a school dress code provision. In that 
case, the United States Supreme Court considered First Amendment challenges to a 
school’s suspension of students for wearing black armbands in protest of the 
Vietnam War.27 The Court famously explained that neither students nor teachers 
“shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate,” finding that schools can only restrict such conduct if it would 
 
20 Todd Gitlin, THE SIXTIES: YEARS OF HOPE, DAYS OF RAGE 18 (1987); James Wright, “The 
Baby Boomer War,” NY Times (Apr. 11, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/11/opinion/the-baby-boomer-war.html?auth=login-
email&login=email.  
21 Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7 at 56. 
22 Id.; see also Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 610 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc) (“This is another 
of the multitude of lawsuits which have recently inundated the federal courts attacking hair 
length regulations promulgated by local public school authorities.”). 
23 See Clarke, supra note 18 at 918. 
24 See, e.g., Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1286 (1st Cir. 1970) (holding that the 
suspension of a student for wearing his hair too long violated his constitutional personal 
liberties); Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779, 783 (4th Cir. 1972) (finding that the hair length 
regulation lacked justification for infringing on the student’s rights); cf. Jackson v. Dorrier, 
424 F.2d 213, 218 (6th Cir. 1970) (upholding hair length regulation). 
25 Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7 at 57; Noonan v. Green, 80 Cal. Rptr. 513, 515 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1969). 
26 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
27 Id. at 504. 
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“materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate 
discipline in the operation of the school.”28 Applying this standard, the Court 
invalidated the school suspensions as they were motivated by “a mere desire to avoid 
the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular 
viewpoint.”29  
Courts following Tinker interpreted the Court’s language as requiring some 
hard evidence, rather than merely conjecture, that a restriction on expression was 
actually necessary to allow a school “to carry out its educational mission.”30 Few 
opportunities existed to test this new stringent approach, however, as formal school 
dress codes began to disappear from public school handbooks shortly after the 1969 
Tinker decision.31 
 
C. POST-TINKER: THE RISE OF FORMAL DRESS CODE POLICIES 
 
After nearly a generation of relative silence, school dress codes became a topic 
of concern once again in the 1990’s. Only this time, dress codes were heralded as a 
potential solution to the purported scourge of gang violence infecting public 
schools.32 This cultural and political shift reflected the nation’s larger cultural 
commitment to solving societal problems through increased emphasis on “law and 
order,” zero tolerance policies, and punishment.33 The post-civil rights “law and 
 
28 Id. at 506, 509. 
29 Id. at 509. 
30 See, e.g., Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 1971) (determining that under 
circumstance it was not “necessary to infringe on the students’ right to carry out the 
educational mission of the school”); Wallace v. Ford, 346 F. Supp. 156, 162 (E.D. Ark. 1972) 
(Students possess broad freedoms “subject [only] to the right of the school authorities to 
establish [necessary] regulations.”). 
31 Larry D. Bartlett, Hair and Dress Codes Revisited, 33 Educ. L. Rep. 7, 7-8 (1986); see 
also Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7 at 102 (“The Supreme Court failed to decide a case 
involving more general student dress or appearance restrictions before those cases dried up 
due to the disappearance of such restrictions.”). 
32 Alison Mitchell, “Clinton Will Advise Schools on Uniforms,” NY Times (Feb. 25, 1966), 
available at https://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/25/us/clinton-will-advise-schools-on-
uniforms.html (“‘If it means that teen-agers will stop killing each other over designer 
jackets,’ the President said in his weekly radio address, ‘then our public schools should be 
able to require their students to require school uniforms. . . . If it means that the schoolrooms 
will be more orderly, more disciplined, . . . and that our young people will learn to evaluate 
themselves by what they are on the inside instead of what they’re wearing on the outside, 
then our public schools should be able to require their students to wear school uniforms.’”). 
33 Vesla M. Weaver, Frontlash: Race and the Development of Punitive Crime Policy, 21 
Studies in American Political Development 230, 242 (2007); see also Ann Scott Tyson, 
“Schools Fight Gang Colors By Pushing Uniform Gray,” Christian Science Monitor (Apr. 
12, 1996), available at https://www.csmonitor.com/1996/0412/12031.html (describing use 
of armed police officers by one high school in the south side of Chicago to enforce dress 
designed to prevent students from wearing gang colors, even if the codes have a 
disproportionate impact on African American youth wearing designer basketball sneakers). 
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order” era “spawned an entire culture oriented around the values of . . . policing,” 
and “law enforcement became the paradigm through which American society 
identified problems and conceptualized solutions.”34 Unsurprisingly, as this cultural 
shift produced a racially-tinged mass incarceration epidemic among adults, 
increasingly draconian and racially-tinged dress codes led to rapid increases in 
enforcement against children in public schools.35 
President Clinton twice advocated for school dress codes and uniform policies 
in successive State of the Union addresses, and officials in the Clinton 
Administration adopted policies encouraging the use of uniform policies and strict 
dress codes.36 A 1996 “Manual on School Uniforms” published by the Department 
of Justice Office of Elementary and Secondary School Education37 explained in its 
first sentence that communities were adopting school uniform policies specifically 
“[i]n response to growing levels of violence in American schools.”38 Remarking that 
a “safe and disciplined learning environment is the first requirement of a good 
 
34 Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7 at 62; see also Jonathan Simon, GOVERNING THROUGH 
CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A 
CULTURE OF FEAR 3-5 (2007) (“Americans have built a new civil and political order 
structured around the problem of violent crime.”). 
35 Weaver, supra note 33; see also Mark Peffley, The Racial Component of “Race-Neutral” 
Crime Policy Attitudes, 23 Pol. Psychol. 1, 10 (2002); Julia Azari, “From Wallace to Trump, 
The Evolution of ‘Law and Order,’” FiveThirtyEight (Mar. 13, 2016), available at 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/from-wallace-to-trump-the-evolution-of-law-and-order/ 
(“In the 1980s and 1990s, the politics of crime turned distinctly punitive and remained 
racially coded.”); Nadra Nittle, “How kids’ obsession with Air Jordans helped lead to school 
uniforms and stricter dress codes,” Vox (Oct. 10, 2018), available at 
https://www.vox.com/the-goods/2018/10/10/17961124/air-jordans-sneaker-violence-black-
youth-school-dress-codes-school-uniforms (connecting declines in school dress codes in the 
early 1980s with a rise in conservative “preppy” dress that administrators found more 
appealing, and the concomitant rise in dress codes in the late 1980’s with the increased 
popularity of basketball sneakers: “The press largely painted sneakerheads as violent and 
materialistic.”). 
36 1996 State of the Union Address, available at 
https://clintonwhitehouse2.archives.gov/WH/New/other/sotu.html (“[O]ur public schools 
should be able to require their students to wear school uniforms.”); 1997 State of the Union 
Address, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/special/states/docs/sou97.htm (“And we must continue to promote order and 
discipline; supporting communities that introduce school uniforms, impose curfews, enforce 
truancy laws, remove disruptive students from the classroom, and have zero tolerance for 
guns and drugs in schools.”). 
37 United States Dept. of Justice, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, “Manual 
on School Uniforms,” (1996), available at https://perma.cc/MD6J-74CQ. The fact that this 
manual on educational dress was published by the Department of Justice and not the 
Department of Education further illustrates the punitive purposes behind dress code and 
uniform policies of the time. 
38 Id. 
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school”39 (as opposed to a nurturing, stimulating, or intellectually challenging 
environment), the manual noted that strict dress codes offer the following benefits: 
 
• Decreasing violence and theft . . . among students over designer clothing 
and expensive sneakers; 
• Helping prevent gang members from wearing gang colors and insignia at 
school; 
• Instilling students with discipline;  
• Helping parents and students resist peer pressure; 
• Helping students concentrate on their school work; and 
• Helping school officials recognize intruders who come to the school.40 
 
Other Clinton era guidelines regarding school dress codes reminded districts to 
respect religious and political expression and to avoid using unconstitutionally 
vague and overbroad language, but otherwise proceeded on the assumption that any 
dress code policy rationally connected to safety, discipline, or “helping students 
concentrate on their work” would survive judicial scrutiny.41 That assumption 
appears to have proven correct in hindsight, as virtually all challenges to school dress 
code policies since that time – at least ones premised on broad, constitutional rights 
to free expression and substantive autonomy – have failed.42 
This combination of presidential promotion and judicial permissiveness of 
school dress codes helped usher in the current era of pervasive dress code policies. 
“In the two decades since the Clinton administration encouraged American public 
schools to experiment with school uniforms and strict dress codes, such restrictions 
have become a common – though not quite omnipresent – feature of American 
public education.”43 Today, as many as sixty percent of all public school students 
attend schools with strict dress code policies, and another twenty-five percent wear 
school uniforms.44 Restrictions on, severity of, and legislative authorization to 
enforce of dress codes vary widely across the country. At least twenty-two states 
expressly grant local school districts the power to establish dress codes, while school 
districts in other states do so with the tacit consent of the state.45 Some states, like 
 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id.; see also Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7 at 62. 
42 See infra, Section III. 
43 Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7 at 62. 
44 Id.; see also infra note 45. 
45 See Zhou, supra note 6; see also Jocelyn Gecker, “California City Is Latest To Redo 
‘Sexist’ School Dress Code,” https://denver.cbslocal.com/2018/09/19/sexist-dress-code-
half-shirts-school/ (“Dress codes and their severity vary widely nationwide. Twenty-four 
states have policies that give local school districts the power to adopt their own dress codes 
or uniform policies, according to the Education Commission of the States, a nonprofit that 
tracks education policy.”). 
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Arkansas, have state-wide public school dress codes, portions of which specifically 
target only students with female anatomy.46 
These dress restrictive policies have faced several narrow legal challenges, but 
the few broad constitutional challenges “have run into a wall of judicial skepticism 
and have been rejected nearly uniformly, often without thorough consideration.”47 
While many courts have rejected the Supreme Court’s early formulations that dress 
itself has protected expressive value, even those courts willing to entertain free 
expression claims rarely require schools to provide support for their proffered 
justifications that dress policies are necessary. Particularly problematic in the hyper-
sexualized gendered dress code context, courts rarely treat a district’s “lack of 
distraction” justification as anything other than “self-evidently weighty,”48 or 
deserving of substantial deference as a matter of “order, discipline, and pedagogy.”49  
 
III. THE GROWING OBSESSION WITH SEX: GENDERED (AND “GENDER 
NEUTRAL”) DRESS CODES 
 
While research on dress codes remains inconclusive regarding the correlation 
between their implementation with students’ academic outcomes, many educators 
agree that, broadly speaking, they can serve an important purpose: helping insure a 
safe and comfortable learning environment.50 Banning clearly disruptive attire like 
T-shirts with racial epithets or explicit language, or physically disruptive clothing 
like hats with built-in strobe lighting, promotes a productive learning environment 
by avoiding “material and substantial disruptions.”51 
But what is offensive and inappropriate? That answer can be difficult even with 
arguably racist symbols such as Confederate flags or “MAGA” hats.52 It becomes 
that much more subjective when one considers the “offensiveness” not of language 
but of one’s own body. Nevertheless, in recent years, supporters of strict public 
 
46 Gecker, supra note 45 (“The law requires districts to prohibit the wearing of clothing that 
exposes underwear, buttocks, or the breasts of a female student.”). 
47 Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7 at 99. 
48 See, e.g., Blau, 401 F.3d at 405-06 (describing arguments in support of student dress 
restrictions and treating them as largely self-evident); Littlefield, 268 F.3d at 286 
(“Improving the educational process is undoubtedly an important and substantial interest of 
Forney and the school board.”).  
49 See, e.g., Littlefield, 268 F.3d at 287 (“As has been well recognized, federal courts should 
defer to school boards to decide, within constitutional bounds, what constitutes appropriate 
behavior and dress in public schools.”).  
50 Zhou, supra note 6; see also Education Partnerships, Inc., “Research Brief: Student Dress 
Codes and Uniforms,” available at https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED537953.pdf.  
51 Id. 
52 Dave Urbanski, “Law professor blasts student’s MAGA hat as ‘undeniable symbol of 
white supremacy,” The Blaze (July 10, 2019), available at 
https://www.theblaze.com/news/law-professor-blasts-students-maga-hat-as-undeniable-
symbol-of-white-supremacy (quoting professor Jeffrey Omari, who claimed that a student’s 
“shiny red MAGA hat was like a siren spewing derogatory racial obscenities at me for the 
duration of the one hour and fifteen minute class”).  
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school dress restrictions have focused heavily on the “disruption” caused by the 
adolescent female body.53 Some argue that this increased focus derives from 
“complicated trends in sexuality and gender relations that have sexualized young 
women and girls of an ever-decreasing age.”54 But dress codes labeling girls’ bodies 
as “disruptive” because of their inherently sexual nature does the opposite of 
preventing sexualization, particularly when the codes “punish those same young 
people for the power and dangers supposedly implicit in that imputed sexuality.”55  
Numerous scholars have convincingly explained how media, advertising, and 
other influences have pressed upon both young women and men of all ages an 
inherently sexualized account of female adolescence.56 Some, like mass advertising 
critic Jean Kilbourne, have used this reality to justify strict “modesty-based” dress 
code bans.57 Speaking to the Christian Science Monitor about her book SO SEXY SO 
SOON: THE NEW SEXUALIZED CHILDHOOD, Kilbourne claimed that school dress 
codes help take away some of the pressures that girls feel to don sexy outfits.58  
But imposing modesty-based dress restrictions on female students often is 
counterproductive. In fact, in many ways, such dress codes are actively harmful in 
institutionalizing myths about a girl’s inherent sexuality, the dangerousness of her 
body, and her responsibility to protect others from their own lurid sexual stares and 
advances. This harmful messaging reinforces the consent myth that provocative 
dress implies consent to be objectified, or worse. 
 
A. OBSESSING OVER SEX 
 
What Ms. Kilbourne and others promoting this pseudo-protective justification 
for dress codes often miss is that the enforcement of the dress code itself 
unnecessarily and harmfully injects sexualization into an otherwise innocent school 
day. In 2015, an elementary school in Houston sent home a five-year-old 
 
53 Hayley Krischer, “Is Your Body Appropriate to Wear to School?,” NY Times (Apr. 17, 
2018) available at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/17/style/student-bra-nipples-
school.html (recounting story of female high school student who declined to wear a bra to 
school because of a painful sunburn she suffered, and who was forced by the administration 
to place Band-Aids on her nipples to remove any distraction her body might cause to other 
students). 
54 Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7 at 102; see also Harbach, supra note 10 at 1042-43 
(suggesting that educators believe that simply obscuring the female body will diffuse sexual 
tension). 
55 Zhou, supra note 6 (“One of the key concerns is the implication that women should be 
hypercognizant about their physical identity and how the world responds to it.”); Harbach, 
supra note 10 at 1044. 
56 Harbach, supra note 10 at 1041-43. 
57 See generally Jean Kilbourne, SO SEXY SO SOON: THE NEW SEXUALIZED CHILDHOOD AND 
WHAT PARENTS CAN DO TO PROTECT THEIR KIDS (Ballantine Books 2009). 
58 Ellen Friedrichs, “4 Lies About School Dress Codes That Cover Up Their Oppressive 
Effects,” EVERYDAY FEMINISM (Dec. 11, 2014) (“Girls these days are really pressured to 
dress in a very provocative way. All of their role models – celebrities and pop stars – dress 
that way. For them, sexy and attractive is defined in a very cliched and stereotypical way.”). 
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kindergarten student for wearing her favorite rainbow dress “because spaghetti 
straps are against the rules.”59 This admittedly extreme example nevertheless 
highlights several problems with sex-obsessed dress codes. First, the facially gender 
neutral dress code at issue contained several provisions targeting clothing only sold 
for and worn by those who identify as female. Shirts could not expose the chest, 
collarbone, or torso.60 Skirts and sun dresses needed be kept at knee length.61 
Cleavage and bra straps could not be shown.62 
Second, it defies common sense to suggest that a five-year-old girl’s sundress 
exposing her shoulders could possibly cause a “material and substantial disruption” 
to her classmates, most of whom are at least a decade away from becoming sexually 
mature and active. Instead, the enforcement of this implicitly gendered dress code 
required an adult administrator charged with protecting elementary school students 
to sexualize a five-year-old girl and remove her from her educational experience as 
a result.  
Third, enforcing this dress code violation forced the parents of a five-year-old 
girl to decide whether to have an honest yet premature conversation about sex and 
objectification of women’s bodies or mislead their daughter when she asks why she 
had to leave school. This unnecessary injection of sex was only made possible 
because dress codes like those promoted by Ms. Kilbourne – ones purportedly 
designed to protect girls from sexual objectification – exist.63   
 
B. CONSENT IMPLICATIONS OF MODESTY-BASED DRESS CODES 
 
Gender-based critiques of school dress codes focus not only on explicitly 
gendered differences in such codes, but also on facially neutral codes that have a 
disproportionate impact on female students. These critiques draw public attention to 
the fact that most of the restrictions in public school dress codes apply exclusively 
or disproportionately to female attire.64 The stated (and implicit) purposes of these 
 
59 Jef Rouner, “The Apparently Immoral Shoulders of My Five-Year-Old Daughter,” 
HOUSTON PRESS (Apr. 22, 2015), available at https://www.houstonpress.com/arts/the-
apparently-immoral-shoulders-of-my-five-year-old-daughter-7372634.  
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 One particularly offensive Pennsylvania high school dress code reflects the failure of the 
strict dress code system to protect girls: “Ladies: Choose modest attire. No bellies showing, 
keep ‘the girls’ covered and supported, and make sure that nothing is so small that all your 
bits and pieces are hanging out. Please remember as you select an outfit . . . that we don’t 
want to be looking at ‘sausage rolls,’ . . . As you get dressed, remember that you can’t put 
10 pounds of mud in a five-pound sack.” Taylor Pittman, “High School Dress Code Letter 
Advises Girls To Cover Their ‘Sausage Rolls,’” HUFFPOST (May 29, 2015), available at 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/biglerville-high-school-dress-code-sausage-
rolls_n_7463576.  
64 See Zhou, supra note 6; Galen Sherwin, “5 Things Public Schools Can and Can’t Do When 
It Comes To Dress Codes,” ACLU (May 30, 2017), available at 
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dress codes, the objectification of girls’ bodies required to enforce the codes, and 
the harmful disproportionate impact of these codes entrench and institutionalizing 
myths around female body ownership and sexual consent at a dangerously young 
age. 
 
1. STATED AND IMPLICIT PURPOSES OF SEX-OBSESSED DRESS CODES 
 
Modesty-based dress codes reinforce the message that girls’ bodies are 
inherently dangerous to men and boys, and that they are responsible for any 
unwanted attention they receive. Gendered dress codes ask girls “to curtail their self-
expression not for their own benefit but for the benefit of young men who are 
allegedly distracted by sharing public space with women.”65 This “lack of 
distraction” rationale – that if “not properly covered, a male student might become 
so entranced with a female student’s shoulder that he could completely miss out on 
all the information in the class” – has been repeated numerous times by school 
administrators defending these codes.66 As one high school student told a reporter 
in 2017, “My principal constantly says the main reason for it is to create a distraction 
free learning environment for our male counterparts.”67  
Even more troubling than the rationale itself, administrators fault not the male 
student who gazed sexually at a classmate and failed to pay attention in class; instead 
“the girl he was distracted by holds all the responsibility.”68 This messaging that 
girls are responsible for the lurid and sexual temptations of boys institutionalizes the 
corrosive notion that girls’ “bodies are always sexualized and bad, and that they 
must cover them up to appear decent.”69 It diminishes and shames a part of 
someone’s personhood – the body – of which growing girls and boys should be 
proud, teaching girls that, to at least half of the world’s population, their bodies are 
 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/womens-rights/womens-rights-education/5-things-public-
schools-can-and-cant-do-when-it-comes.  
65 Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7 at 99. 
66 Emily Miller, “Dress Code Sexism,” HER CAMPUS (Apr. 24, 2017) (“Dress codes are 
enforced for the comfort and ‘lack of distraction’ for male students. Girl’s [sic] bodies 
apparently pose an inconvenience for the teenage boy. If not properly covered, a male student 
might become so entranced with a female student’s shoulder that he could completely miss 
out on all the information in the class. And whose fault is that? According to schools, the girl 
he was distracted by holds all the responsibility.”). 
67 Zhou, supra note 6 (“In 2014, a group of middle school students in Maplewood-South 
Orange, New Jersey, started the hashtag campaign #IAmMoreThanADistraction, to call 
attention to their school’s dress code.”). 
68 Id. (“Many districts across the country justify female-specific rules with that logic, and 
effectively, place[s] the onus on girls to prevent inappropriate reactions from their male 
classmates.”). 
69 Catherine McCall, “The Sexualization of Women and Girls,” Psychology Today (Mar. 4, 
2012), available at https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/overcoming-child-
abuse/201203/the-sexualization-women-and-girls (drawing the psychological connection 
between sexualization of girls in school and child abuse). 
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both 1) dangerous, and 2) the only thing most men and boys see.70 Obsessing over 
girls’ bodies in student dress codes harmfully places the focus on physical 
appearance over physical abilities, mental capabilities, or emotional development, 
perpetuating the troubling message that women exist for the consumption of 
society.71  
Educators and sociologists have argued that dress codes grounded in such logic 
amplify a broader social expectation: “that women are the ones who need to protect 
themselves from unwanted attention and that those wearing what could be 
considered sexy clothing are ‘asking for’ a response.”72 One sociologist found that 
“dress codes normalize certain forms of girlhood, problematize others, and suggest 
girls’ responsibility for the school’s moral climate.”73 
This rationale also communicates harmful and dangerous methods to both boys 
and girls regarding consent. It tells boys that it is “the girl’s responsibility to cover 
up, and if she doesn’t it’s her fault he got distracted.”74 It gives cart blanche for boys 
to lean into the myth that “they are incapable of controlling their own urges.”75 
Conversely, it tells girls that they are responsible for preventing this irresistible urge 
of the opposite sex, and that it is their fault for dressing so provocatively if boys 
gaze, leer, whistle, catcall, or touch. As one dress code critic noted, this approach 
serves as a microcosm of “a culture that’s so used to looking at issues of harassment 
and assault through the wrong end of the telescope,” directed at “girls’ own clothing” 
rather than the kind of sexually predatory behavior directed at girls.76 Or as another 
critic put it more bluntly, ‘[r]ather than teaching boys that looking up girls’ skirts is 
wrong – no matter how convenient the angle might be – they enforce a rule that 
punishes a high school girl for being sexualized by her peers.”77 
 
70 Friedrichs, supra note 58 (“The confidence and pride she might take in her appearance is 
automatically stripped from her when she is told that she is dressing inappropriately.”); see 
also Zhou, supra note 6 (“The dress code makes girls feel self-conscious, ashamed, and 
uncomfortable in their own bodies.”). And by placing blame on the female student for 
tempting boys with their bodies, schools institutionalize the message that the only truly 
relevant part of the girl’s personhood is a dangerous weapon that must be kept under wraps. 
Id. 
71 Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7 at 99 (contending that gendered dress codes tell girls that 
“[t]heir permission to enter the public space is conditioned on acquiescence to a state-
sanctioned gaze that draws attention to their bodies and conceptualizes them as sexual objects 
rather than equal members of a learning community”). 
72 Zhou, supra note 6. 
73 Friedrichs, supra note 58. 
74 Miller, supra note 66. 
75 Zhou, supra note 6 (“Often they report hearing phrases like, ‘boys will be boys,’ from 
teachers.”); see also Mieke Eerkens, “When Judges Assume That Men Cannot Control Their 
Own Sexual Urges,” The Atlantic (Jul. 17, 2013) (recalling Iowa Supreme Court case 
upholding dismissal of female employee because her male employer found her too 
irresistibly attractive). 
76 Zhou, supra note 6. 
77 Miller, supra note 66; see also Rebecca Klein, “High School Student Accuses School Of 
‘Shaming Girls For Their Bodies,’ With Dress Code,” HuffPost (Jun. 2, 2014) (“One sign 
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This distorted view of responsibility holds obvious and disturbing parallels in 
criminal sexual assault cases. School dress codes tell girls that their permission to 
enter public is conditioned on an adult’s determination that those around her can 
control themselves.78 And this entire narrative reinforces scripts and assumptions 
about gender and sexuality that misplace responsibility for sexual violence on its 
victims.79 
 
2. OBJECTIFICATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
 
The enforcement of these modesty-based dress codes requires a literal gaze of 
adult school officials (mostly male) who are required to view young women sexually 
in order to assess their compliance with dress restrictions. In other words, dress 
codes designed to prevent sexualization of girls requires the very thing type of 
objectification the rules are purportedly designed to prevent.80 
The enforcement of dress code violations by men through a predominantly male 
lens as a result of predominantly male sexualization parallels troublingly with the 
experience of criminal sexual assault victims. Women reporting their own rapes and 
sexual assaults to police officers regularly express frustration with the “credibility 
discount” they encounter from predominantly male police officers in believing their 
stories.81 A 2015 Department of Justice report on the prosecution of sex crimes in 
the United States found substantial and pervasive problems with male police officers 
 
hung outside a New Jersey high school protesting the school’s gendered dress code stated, 
‘Don’t humiliate her because she is wearing shorts. It’s hot outside. Instead of shaming girls 
for their bodies, teach boys that girls are not sexual objects.’ As one student said, ‘To me, 
that’s not a girl’s problem, that’s a guy’s problem.’”). 
78 Friedrichs, supra note 58 (“This view assumes that the sexualization is the fault of the girl, 
and not the person sexualizing her.” A teen may simply be trying to dress fashionably, and 
the fault ought to lie with the adult sexualizing her.). 
79 Miller, supra note 66 (“This plays right into rape culture. . . . What is a question that is so 
commonly asked in rape cases? You guessed it: ‘What was she wearing?’”). 
80 Friedrichs, supra note 58 (“Really, claiming that dress codes prevent ‘sexualization’ of 
girls seems more like a paternalistic excuse given by people who are uncomfortable 
admitting that some teen girls may choose to express their sexuality through their 
appearance, or by others who themselves draw sexual conclusions about teens in certain 
outfits.”); see also Suzannah Weiss, “5 Ways School Dress Codes Reinforce Rape Culture, 
Because Women Aren’t A ‘Distraction,’” Bustle (Feb. 23, 2016). 
81 Deborah Tuerkheimer, Incredible Women: Sexual Violence and the Credibility Discount, 
166 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 33 (2017) (“The typical law enforcement investigation is guilt-
presumptive (and potentially problematic for that reason). In sexual assault cases, this 
presumption is flipped.”). 
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expressing skepticism about the veracity of rape allegations.82 Even when cases do 
make it to court, judges continue to express confusion regarding consent.83 
Just as male-centric enforcement of a minor female’s dress misplaces 
responsibility for the sexualization of young girls and misrepresents the notion of 
consent to sexual attention, criminal sexual assault adjudication remains archaic 
societal attitudes about “sexual autonomy and gender roles in sexual relations.” 
When school administrators communicate that girls are responsible for any sexual 
attention they may receive from their classmates or teachers, it should come as little 
surprise that “jurors, prosecutors, and police are confused about the boundary line 
between sex and rape.”84 
 
3. THE DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT ON FEMALE STUDENTS 
 
Modesty-based dress codes subject young women “to more specific limitations 
on their expression than young men. They are required to spend more time and 
emotional energy on ensuring compliance with state appearance standards than 
young men.”85 This reality tangibly harms girls’ educations at rates disproportionate 
to their male counterparts, and once again communicates that girls and women are 
less deserving of the resources available in the public domain than boys and men. 
Consider the following common dress code provision: “Clothing and 
accessories must not be disruptive to teaching and learning. . . No spaghetti tank 
tops, no low-cut blouses, tube/halter tops, midriff tops. No short-shorts, mini-skirts. 
All shorts/skirts must be at relaxed hand level. No bra straps. No leggings or yoga 
 
82 Soraya Chemaly, “How Police Still Fail Rape Victims,” Rolling Stone (Aug. 16, 2016), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/features/how-police-still-fail-rape-victims-w434669 
(citing Department of Justice report on Baltimore City Police Department practices: “One 
officer in the [Baltimore P.D.] sex crimes unit explained, ‘In homicide, there are real victims; 
all our rape cases are bullshit.’”).  
83 See Shawn E. Fields, Debunking the Stranger-in-the-Bushes Myth: The Case for Sexual 
Assault Protection Orders, 2017 Wis. L. Rev. 429, 433 (2017) (recalling rape case in which 
one judge asked a nineteen-year-old victim who was raped over a bathroom sink, “Why 
couldn’t you just keep your knees together? … Why didn’t you just sink your bottom down 
into the basin so he couldn’t penetrate you? … If you were frightened, you could have 
screamed.”). Judge Camp also wondered aloud during the trial “why she allowed the sex to 
happen if she didn’t want it,” and that “she certainly had the ability, perhaps learnt from her 
experience on the streets, to tell (him) to f--- off.” Id. See also Shawn E. Fields, Sexual 
Violence and Future Harm: Lessons From Asylum Law, 2020 UTAH L. REV. __ (forthcoming 
2020) (describing harmful impacts of consent myths on adjudication of restraining order 
petitions).  
84 Id. (“The vast majority of people - including law enforcement personnel, judges and 
potential jurors - remain conflicted about what constitutes ‘consensual’ sex. They are 
ambivalent about placing criminal sanctions on ‘non-violent’ sexual assault or, for that 
matter, anything short of violent penetration that results in physical injuries. Jurors, 
prosecutors and police are confused about the boundary line between sex and rape.”).  
85 Miller, supra note 66 (“Policies are almost always directed strictly toward girls; some even 
specify for girls only.”). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3521988
17 
 
pants.”86 This facially neutral dress codes restrict clothing in a way that functionally 
affects only girls. “Boys shorts are made longer, their tank tops have thicker straps, 
and they have no bra straps or cleavage to hide.”87  
These gendered dress codes, even if facially neutral, have the effect of 
“focusing a disproportionate amount of female students’ attention on policing their 
own appearance and sexuality.”88 At Tottenville High School on Staten Island, a 
study found that its dress code banning clothes like tank tops and mini-skirts led to 
over one hundred disciplinary actions per month –  with more than ninety percent of 
those actions taken against girls.89 
The disruption and humiliation attendant with enforcing attire rules also bears 
mention. “Frequently, students are openly called out in the middle of class, told to 
leave and change, and sometimes, to go home and find a more appropriate outfit. In 
some instances, girls must wear brightly colored shirts that can exacerbate the 
embarrassment, emblazoned with words like ‘Dress Code Violator.’”90 In short, 
“who has to dress a certain way to make sure their body is covered? Who will be 
asked to change if they don’t follow this rule? Who will be taken out of class or even 
sent home if their clothes are deemed to be too distracting? Girls.”91 
The purpose, enforcement, and disproportionate impact of modesty-based dress 
codes all institutionalize harmful myths and stereotypes that almost uniformly hurt 
girls. “They are grounded in patriarchal assumptions about the dangers of the female 
body and the primacy of male claims to public space and services,” they reinforce 
the false narrative that women are responsible for protecting themselves and altering 
their behavior to serve male interests, and they highlight the state’s unwillingness to 
take responsibility for protecting women from physical and sexual assault.92  
 
C. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO SEX-OBSESSED DRESS CODES 
 
While the primary purpose of this Essay is not to lay groundwork for new legal 
challenges to school dress, it bears reflecting on recent failed attempts to challenge 
sex-obsessed dress codes on constitutional and Title IX grounds. These failures, in 
the face of compelling arguments, reinforce the state’s unwillingness to take 
 
86 Jennifer Weiss-Wolf, “My Daughter Was Dress-Coded for Wearing Shorts,” Slate (Jun. 
9, 2014). 
87 Miller, supra note 66 (In short, “dress codes are clearly written for girls. No one is 
monitoring the length of any guy’s cargo shorts, but someone is always watching for a dress 
that comes up a little too short.”). 
88 Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7 at 104.  
89 Ryan Broderick, “This High School’s ‘Sexist’ Dress Code Has Caused 200 Detentions in 
Just the Last Two Weeks,” BuzzFeed News (Sept. 16, 2014). 
90 Zhou, supra note 6 (“That’s crazy they’re caring more about two inches of a girl’s thigh 
being shown than them being in class.”). 
91 Miller, supra note 66 (“Because a female student’s body might pose a distraction to a male 
student’s education, her education is interrupted and put on hold until she can find something 
more suitable for the classroom.”). 
92 Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7 at 102. 
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seriously the threats to girls and women through patriarchal institutions like 
gendered dress codes. 
Broad-based challenges to dress codes have focused on substantive due process 
rights to autonomy, First Amendment rights to free expression, Equal Protection 
challenges based on gender, and Title IX challenges as applied to disruptions to 
female education. 
 
1. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS  
 
Modern substantive due process formulations consider the zone of individual 
autonomy to which individuals deserve protection absent overriding state 
justification. As decisions within the zone of autonomy become more personal, 
important, and central to the development of individual identity, government action 
requires a more substantial justification. Some decisions, according to recent 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, are made free from “the compulsion of the State.”93  
The importance of dressing oneself as a decision worthy of constitutional 
autonomous protection has undergone significant redefinition since Tinker. While 
courts throughout the 1970’s acknowledged the importance of dress and presentation 
as a central component of individual liberty,94 more recent decisions blithely refer 
to students’ right to “look nice” or wear clothes they “feel good in.”95 In one leading 
Sixth Circuit case, the court trivialized a student’s substantive due process claim as 
resting on a purported right to wear blue jeans rather than any truly important liberty 
interest worthy of constitutional protection.96 
This liberty interest, when framed so narrowly, is doomed to give way to the 
admittedly important interest of public educators to provide a safe and productive 
learning environment for the nation’s children. But the showing required for this 
government justification has undergone radical transformation since Tinker as well. 
As discussed supra, courts in the immediate wake of  Tinker read that decision as 
requiring an actual showing by the government – through empirical evidence or 
otherwise – not only that a proposed dress code action was rationally related to the 
stated objective but actually did further that objective.97 This stringent requirement 
 
93 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“At the heart of liberty is the 
right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the 
mystery of life.”). 
94 See, e.g., Richards, 424 F.2d at 1286 (finding “within the commodious concept of liberty” 
the right to “wear one’s hair as he wishes: “The Founding Fathers wrote an amendment for 
speech and assembly; even they did not deem it necessary to write an amendment for 
personal appearance.”). 
95 Blau, 401 F.3d at 392. 
96 Id. 
97 See, e.g., Bishop, 450 F.2d at 1075 (rejecting school dress code policy that was not 
“necessary . . . to carry out the educational mission of the school”); Stevenson v. Bd. Of Educ. 
Of Wheeler Cty., 426 F.2d 1154, 1157-58 (5th Cir. 1970) (upholding hair length restriction 
only after school provided evidence of conflict and disruption in the classroom arising from 
hair length). 
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led, at first, to judicial override of hair length codes, and later, to the decline in school 
dress codes generally.98 
Contemporary courts take a far different approach, accepting at face value the 
bare assertions of schools that dress codes further the various goals of order, 
discipline, safety, and fostering a productive learning environment.99 While granting 
deference to the expertise of school administrators in choosing how best to operate 
their schools may make sense, limits to that deference must exist. Indeed, the entire 
body of our liberty-based due process jurisprudence rests on the ability of the Court 
to probe the importance of a stated government objective and the connection of that 
objective to the challenged action. Those limits appear lacking in the school dress 
code context. 
 
2. FIRST AMENDMENT 
 
Broad First Amendment challenges to school dress codes have also failed, but 
for slightly different reasons. One reason concerns the ambiguity in First 
Amendment jurisprudence itself regarding nonverbal expression. First Amendment 
law recognizes that the freedom of expression encompasses a wide variety of 
conduct intended to communicate political and social ideas. Here, the conduct in 
question – “styling one’s appearance and determining how to present oneself for 
public consumption in a public school setting – is inherently richly communicative.” 
100  
However, courts have expressed confusion over the extent to which the First 
Amendment covers such generalized expression as “dress,” or whether it covers it 
at all.101 As recently explained by Professors Mark Tushnet, Alan K. Chen, and 
Joseph Blocher in an important new book titled FREE SPEECH BEYOND WORDS: THE 
SURPRISING REACH OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT,102 the source of the confusion 
appears to be whether the type of nuanced messaging in self-styling is itself a source 
for protection under the Free Speech Clause, or whether the styling is merely 
connected to other values protected by the First Amendment.103  
To the extent courts have been forced to decide this issue, they have uniformly 
rejected First Amendment challenges to broad dress codes. Much of the reasoning 
 
98 See supra note 97. 
99 See Blau, 401 F.3d at 392 (upholding school dress code when only evidence presented was 
“affidavits from three teachers who agreed that the dress code had a positive impact on the 
Highlands learning environment”). 
100 Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7 at 102; see also Grace Q. Vicary, THE SIGNS OF CLOTHING, 
IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES IN NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION 299 (Fernando 
Poyatos ed., 1988). (“Clothing is basic to definition of self. It is impossible to discuss 
clothing, even as distant history, and ignore disquieting inner questions such as ‘what do the 
clothes I am wearing say about me?’”).  
101 Id. 
102 Mark Tushnet, Alan K. Chen, and Joseph Blocher, FREE SPEECH BEYOND WORDS: THE 
SURPRISING REACH OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (NYU PRESS 2017)  
103 Id. at 34-37. 
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appears again connected to the narrow framing of what self-styling actually means 
to a child as a form of expression, which itself renders it less deserving of protection 
in the face of countervailing government objectives.104 It remains to be seen how the 
analysis might change if a court with a more expansive view of the communicative 
nature of dress faces this issue. 
 
3. EQUAL PROTECTION 
 
Perhaps more relevant to the subject of this Essay are gender-based challenges 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Dress codes with 
explicitly gendered differences are automatically suspect and require an 
“exceedingly persuasive justification” to withstand constitutional challenge.105 
These codes are subjected to the Court’s intermediate scrutiny framework, requiring 
that the gender classification (1) serve “important government objectives” and (2) 
must be “substantially related to those important objectives.”106 
Many school dress codes, such as those discussed in this Essay, are so poorly 
written and facially discriminatory that they would likely fail under a 
straightforward application of this test. Indeed, the Supreme Court has regularly 
expressed skepticism with “regulatory regimes that impose broad, differential 
burdens on the civil participation of women for the ad hoc justifications states use 
to rationalize such regimes.”107 
Surprisingly few Equal Protection challenges have been brought against 
explicitly gendered dress codes, but one such challenge recently succeeded in the 
Eastern District of North Carolina. In Peltier v. Charter Day School,108 three 
students sued a charter school in North Carolina and challenged a policy that 
required girls to wear skirts or jumpers, and prohibited them from wearing shorts or 
 
104 Blau, 401 F.3d at 391 (doubting whether the desire to dress oneself generally garners First 
Amendment protection, but nonetheless rejecting the claim because of the existence of 
“important governmental interests” such as “bridging socio-economic gaps between families 
. . . focusing attention on learning . . . and enhancing school safety”); Littlefield, 268 F.3d at 
285-86 (assuming “without deciding that the First Amendment applies to expressive conduct 
implicated in the mandatory Uniform Policy,” but upholding the policy because “improving 
the educational process is undoubtedly an important and substantial interest”). 
105 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (holding that government actions that 
facially classify on gender violate the Equal Protection Clause unless the government can 
provide an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for gender-specific action). 
106 See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 60 (2001) (restating that the standard is that the gender 
classification (1) serve "important government objectives" and (2) must be "substantially 
related to those important objectives"); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding 
that classifications based on gender must serve "important government objectives" and the 
government action must be "substantially related to the achievement of those objectives"). 
107 Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7 at 122; see Virginia, 518 U.S. at 557 (“Virginia . . . has 
closed [VMI] to its daughters, and instead devised for them a ‘parallel program’ with faculty 
less impressively credentialed and less well paid, more limited course offerings, fewer 
opportunities for military training and for scientific specialization.”). 
108 384 F. Supp. 3d 579 (E.D.N.C. 2019). 
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pants.109 They argued that the policy “subject[ed] them to archaic stereotypes about 
what constitutes appropriate behavior and conduct for girls, reinforcing the notion 
that girls, but not boys, must dress and behave modestly, that they are less physically 
active than boys and that they should behave and dress in a manner that is otherwise 
traditionally considered appropriately feminine.”110  
The court observed that “the caselaw in this specific area is not well 
developed,” acknowledging that most “dress code cases are claims based on the First 
Amendment.”111 The court also acknowledged that “[c]ourts traditionally refrain 
from regulating the day-to-day issues presented in local schools.”112 However, the 
court found that the skirt requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause: 
While this court recognizes that certain sex-differentiated 
standards consistent with community norms may be permissible, 
the skirts requirement in this case is not consistent with community 
norms. Women (and girls) have, for at least several decades, 
routinely worn both pants and skirts in various settings, including 
professional settings and school settings. Females have been 
allowed to wear trousers or pants in all but the most formal or 
conservative settings since the 1970s. . . . most public school dress 
codes across the country allowed girls to wear pants or shorts by the 
mid-1980s. . . . community standards which may account for the 
differences in standards applied to men and women, girls and boys, 
do not remain fixed in perpetuity.  
While defendants argue the skirts requirement is based on the traditional values 
approach of the school as a whole and is in place to instill discipline and keep order, 
defendants have shown no connection between these stated goals and the 
requirement that girls wear skirts.113  
This hopeful ruling certainly represents a step in the right direction. But it also 
rested on the explicitly gendered nature of the dress code. Most school dress codes 
are facially neutral as to gender, even if they work in form and function to target and 
are disproportionately enforced against girls. Lacking explicit discrimination, any 
Equal Protection challenge will require proof of purposeful sex discrimination to 
 
109 Id. at 584-85. 
110 Erin Buzuvis, “Title IX Dress Code Case Survives Motion to Dismiss,” Title IX Blog 
(Apr. 4, 2017), available at https://title-ix.blogspot.com/2017/04/title-ix-dress-code-case-
survives.html (quoting complaint). 
111 Peltier, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 595-96. 
112 Id. at 595. 
113 Id. at 596. 
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succeed.114 That evidentiary showing is difficult, complicated, and in the area of sex 
discrimination, rarely successful.115 
 
4. TITLE IX 
 
Absent evidence of purposeful sex discrimination, Title IX claims against 
facially neutral school dress codes could theoretically provide relief. Title IX 
provides: “No person ... shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, 
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”116 Unlike Equal 
Protection challenges to facially neutral government action, plaintiffs bringing Title 
IX claims can “show that a facially neutral practice has a disparate impact” to carry 
their prima facie burden.117 However, the government can rebut that prima facie 
showing “by proving a business or educational necessity for the practice,” which 
may foreclose relief for plaintiffs suing school districts in courts that grant 
substantial deference to amorphous justifications such as order, discipline, and 
preventing distractions.118  
The larger hurdle, at least currently, appears to be the Department of Education. 
In Peltier, the same court that granted plaintiffs summary judgment on their Equal 
Protection claim granted defendants summary judgment on their Title IX claim.119 
In doing so, the court cited recent administrative guidance from the Department of 
Education that Title IX permits “issues involving codes of personal appearance to 
be resolved at the local level.”120 It is important to note, however, that this setback 
came in a case bringing a facial challenge to a gendered dress code. As empirical 
 
114 See Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274-75 (1979) 
(analogizing race-based cases to find that a law having a disparate impact on a historically 
disadvantaged gender group did not violate the constitution absent a showing of purposeful 
discrimination). 
115 See Mary Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex 
Discrimination Law As a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1447, 1466 (2000); 
see also Long v. Bd. Of Educ. Of Jefferson County, 121 F. Supp. 2d 621, 627-28 (W.D. Ky. 
2000) (subjecting the school’s  imposition of a sex-neutral, uniform-type dress code to the 
Feeney test and finding the code was rationally related to the legitimate purpose of ensuring 
student safety and fostering school order). 
116 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). 
117 Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that, under Title 
IX, “plaintiffs can show that a facially neutral practice has a disparate impact,” but 
defendants “may still prevail by proving a business or educational necessity for the 
practice”). 
118 Id. 
119 Peltier, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 590. 
120 Id. (“Title IX does not directly speak to the ‘precise question’ of school uniform policies 
or appearance codes, suggesting that Congress left this matter to the agency's discretion. 
Additionally, in thirty-five years, Congress has never overridden ED's interpretation of the 
statute. ED has provided an answer, interpreting Title IX to ‘permit[] issues involving codes 
of personal appearance to be resolved at the local level.’”).  
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evidence such as that highlighted in this Essay becomes more prevalent regarding 
the disproportionately adverse impacts such dress codes have on female education, 
an as-applied challenge may have greater chances of success in the future. 
 
IV.INSTITUTIONS, MESSAGING, AND CONSENT 
 
The foregoing discussion highlights the parallels between the shaming and 
victim-blaming central to enforcement of sexualized dress code policies and the 
shaming and victim-blaming so often central to rape and sexual assault 
adjudications. Just as a girl’s choice of clothing is scrutinized for sexual 
communication to those around her in determining whether she has invited 
“distracting” attention, a sexual violence victim’s clothing is scrutinized for sexual 
communication to the perpetrator to determine whether she impliedly invited the 
altercation. The question “what was she wearing?” remains very a part of the defense 
attorney’s lexicon in rape cases, and one can hardly blame the attorney when judges 
and juries remain persuaded that a rape victim’s fashion choices are relevant to the 
issue of consent.121 
This concluding section explores the implications of that parallel more directly 
with respect to certain pervasive troubling myths in criminal sexual assault 
adjudication: A) the notion of implied general consent to sexual activity (or, framed 
differently, the false narrative of “worthiness” in prosecution; B) the myth of the 
perfect victim; and C) the myth of the unstoppable male. 
 
A. IMPLIED GENERAL CONSENT TO SEXUAL CONTACT 
 
Many modesty-based dress code critics observe that girls often wear short skirts 
or spaghetti strap simply because it is hot or because the clothing is fashionable, not 
to appear sexy.122 Undoubtedly, that is true. But one should ask a more basic 
question here: what if high school girls want to feel and look sexy? What, exactly, 
is wrong with that level of self-expression and agency? If we want girls (and boys) 
to be confident in their own skin, to feel proud of their own identities and 
individuality, to have positive body images, then what precisely is inappropriate 
about a girl choosing to feel and look sexy? 
The answer, apparently, is that expressing oneself sexually may attract 
attention, for which the one expressing herself must be held accountable. Rather than 
acknowledging that a girl can dress how she wants and others are responsible for 
 
121 Hannah Brenner, Kathleen Darcy, Gina Fedock, and Sheryl Kubiack, Bars to Justice: The 
Impact of Rape Myths on Women in Prison, 17 Geo J. Gender & L. 521, 540 (2016) 
(explaining that questions designed to perpetuate the rape myth that a woman was “asking 
for it” based on her behavior including “Was she drinking alcohol or using drugs at the time 
of the assault?” “What was she wearing?” and “Was she walking alone?”). 
122 Miller, supra note 66 (showing picture of a makeshift sign posted outside a school 
classroom, stating in part, “It’s hot outside. Instead of shaming girls for their bodies, teach 
boys that girls are not sexual objects.”). 
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their own responses, schools preemptively shut down that form of confident self-
expression because other people may respond inappropriately.123 
To put a finer point on it, a school-age girl may in fact want to dress 
provocatively to attract attention from a particular person, be it a boyfriend or 
girlfriend, or simply a love interest. Inviting a consensual response from that singular 
individual, however, does not mean that she has granted general consent to all people 
in the public sphere. Dressing oneself is the responsibility of that person; the 
response to that dress is everyone else’s responsibility, and nothing about the nature 
of one’s dress does or can grant implied general consent to make sexual advances.  
Likewise, a woman has every right to dress provocatively (or in the words of 
Ms. Kilbourne, “don sexy outfits”)124 in public with the purpose of attracting 
attention and, perhaps, a sexual companion. Her clothing may even communicate 
that desire, as dress is inherently communicative and expressive.125 But just because 
the general public can see that communication does not mean the person wearing 
those clothes has granted implied general consent for all to make sexual advances. 
So often lacking in public discourse around dress and consent is the basic 
fundamental recognition that a person’s dress cannot, by itself, communicate 
consent for anyone to do anything. There simply exists no general implied consent 
to engage sexually or otherwise with a sexily dressed woman. Neither does there 
exist any specific implied consent for a particular person to engage sexually with a 
sexily dressed woman, even if that woman has consented to converse or otherwise 
interact with that person.126  
 These basic premises should be noncontroversial. As formulated, they likely 
are. But they also contradict the messaging behind placing responsibility on the girl 
to dress modestly, lest she arouse a response from a boy. That messaging 
institutionalizes the notion that, even if the girl who wore short shorts did not 
specifically want boys to stare at her and make lewd comments, she impliedly “asked 
for it” because she “should have known better” than to dress that way. Similarly, 
when a rape investigation focuses on whether the victim’s dress was “too 
provocative” – or, for that matter, whether she was “out too late,”127 “in the wrong 
 
123 See generally supra Section II. 
124 See supra note 57.  
125 See Vicary, supra note 100 at 323. 
126 Cf. H.M. Malm, The Ontological Status of Consent and Its Implications for the Law on 
Rape, 2 Legal Theory 147, 148 (1996) (exploring various societal understandings of 
“implied” or “tacit” consent as “consent given by refraining from an act rather than 
performing an act,” but admonishing against applying a sliding scale of tacit consent to easily 
in high-stakes situations like rape). 
127 Jessica Valenti, In Rape Tragedies, the Shame is Ours, The Nation (Apr. 17, 2013) 
(“[W]henever we blame a woman for being attacked - when we speculate about what she 
was wearing, suggest she shouldn't have been drinking or that she stayed out too late – we’re 
making the world safer for rapists.”). 
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part of town,”128 or “too intoxicated”129 – it communicates that she impliedly “asked 
for it” because she “should have known better.”130  
 
B. THE PERFECT VICTIM 
 
At its core, these victim-blaming messages communicate a societal judgment 
that girls and women who behave in a certain way are less deserving of protection 
from sexual violence because they engage in behavior of which we disapprove. 
Some express this disapproval through the lens burden sharing and risk prevention. 
Women ought to take simple safety precautions (that men do not have to take), make 
smarter decisions (expending mental energy not required of men), or not put 
themselves “in the wrong place at the wrong time” (places and times that are not off 
limits to men). In short, women ought to work diligently not to get raped.131  
This type of victim-blaming mentality derives from the myth of the “perfect 
victim,”132 the pure, virginal, modest woman who did nothing to provoke or invite 
 
128 Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape 354-55 (1975) (“Women 
have been raped by men . . . for behavior no more provocative than walking down the road 
at night in the wrong part of town . . .”). 
129 Valenti, supra note 105. 
130 State v. Neal, 34 Kan. App. 2d 485, 493 (2005) (summarizing trial court transcript in rape 
case in which defense counsel wondered aloud if rape victim “should have known better 
when she was at the Kwik Shop, because by that time Patrick Neal was already putting his 
hands on her”). 
131 See, e.g., Charlotte Hilton Andersen, “How to Teach Girls How Not to Get Raped,” Great 
Fitness Experiment (Jan. 10, 2013, 10:15 AM), 
http://www.thegreatfitnessexperiment.com/2013/01/how-to-teach-girls-how-not-to-get-
raped.html (describing a self-defense class in a which the teacher told young girls to report 
any attempted assault or rape, “because if you don't report it - what if your best friend comes 
walking along that same path 2 weeks later and gets raped? If you don't report it then it's 
your fault if other girls get hurt,” and offering suggestions for teaching prevention of sexual 
assault in ways that would not shift responsibility to victims); Katherine Anne Roiphe, The 
Morning After (1993) at 9 (describing the first week of college for a female student, where 
“there are fliers and counselors and videotapes tell us how not to get AIDS and how not to 
get raped, where not to wander and what signals not to send”); cf. Zerlina Maxwell, “Stop 
Telling Women How to Not Get Raped,” EBONY (Jan. 14, 2012), available at 
https://www.ebony.com/news/stop-telling-women-how-to-not-get-raped/ (“No more ad 
campaigns and public service announcements targeted at women to teach them how to avoid 
rape. . . . We need anti-rape campaigns that target young men and boys.”); Chris Linder, 
“Telling women how not to get raped won’t stop sexual violence on campus,” THE 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2018), available at https://www.theguardian.com/higher-education-
network/2018/aug/02/telling-women-how-not-to-get-raped-wont-stop-sexual-violence-on-
campus (recommending that universities shift focus from sobering statistics about how many 
women are sexually assaults and “teaching [those] women how not to get raped” to the fact 
that “one in 10 men studying at university have committed sexual violence” and “teaching 
[those] perpetrators not to rape”). 
132 This use of the phrase “perfect victim” does not refer to the mythical “perfect rape victim” 
who responds to unwanted sexual advances in the manner preferred by judges and juries – 
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her attack, and thus who is morally blameless.133 Despite the #MeToo Movement’s 
attempts to direct attention to the nuances of sexual assault, and particularly the 
nuances of victim responses in vulnerable coercive settings, society still identifies 
“the image of a ‘victim’ [as] a blameless, pure stereotype, with whom all can 
identify.”134 A “victim” is “an elderly person robbed of her life savings, an ‘innocent 
bystander’ injured or killed during a holdup, or a brutally ravaged rape victim.” 
“Victims” are not “prostitutes beaten senseless . . . drug addicts mugged and robbed 
. . . or misdemeanants raped by cellmates.”135 
The moral superiority expressed against these “imperfect victims” of crimes 
exists in the messaging institutionalized in modesty-based dress codes. A girl who 
wears a short skirt may very well fall victim to boys attempting to look up it, which 
is a form of sexual predation. But according to school administrators, she is not a 
perfect victim or innocent bystander because of her morally questionable choices; 
as such, she will receive discipline rather than protection.136 Only this kind of sexist 
moral purity test can explain why in one high school a girl was “dress coded . . . for 
wearing shorts” just as a male classmate walked by wearing a T-shirt graphically 
 
by screaming, offering forcible physical and verbal resistance, and by immediately calling 
the police and submitting to a medical examination. See Kelly Alison Behre, Ensuring 
Choice and Voice for Campus Sexual Assault Victims: A Call for Victims’ Attorneys, 65 
DRAKE L. REV. 293, 352 (2017) (describing the “harmful rape myth . . . of ‘the perfect 
victim,’ promoting the idea that real victims of sexual assault respond to trauma in one 
uniform manner”). As used here, the phrase also does not include a “perfect victim” from 
the perspective of the perpetrator to identify and target vulnerable individuals for predation. 
It is poignant, and perhaps ironic, however, that often perpetrators identify “perfect victims” 
in part based on the target’s perceived credibility issues. See People v. Fortson, 2018 COA 
46, 49 (Colo. App. 2018) (discussing expert testimony at a child sexual assault trial 
describing the “perfect victim” as one with “developmental or credibility issues, [who] are 
thus less likely to be believed”). 
133 See Martha Chamallas, Gender, Law, and Narrative: Lucky: The Sequel, 80 IND. L.J. 441, 
442 (2005) (describing the mythical “‘perfect’ [rape] victim, who is young, white, and a 
virgin”); see also Brenner et al., supra note 121 at 540 (“Rape myths inform the ‘ideal 
victimhood’ requirement that a victim be ‘carrying out a respectable project’ and is ‘not to 
be blamed.’”). 
134 Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim’s Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 951 (1985). 
135 Id. 
136 See Emily Miller, “Dress Code Sexism,” HER CAMPUS (Apr. 24, 2017) (quoting school 
officials who “sent home 70 students for the way they were dressed. Girls wore skirts that 
were ‘too short’ . . . [because] boys would be able to ‘peer up the girl’s skirts while they 
climbed the stairs’ . . . rather than teaching boys that looking up girl’s [sic] shirts is wrong – 
no matter how convenient the angle might be – they enforce a rule that punishes a high school 
girl for being sexualized by her peers.”). 
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depicting a sex act with the phrase “Good Girls Swallow” emblazoned across the 
front.137 The boy received no punishment.138  
 
C. THE UNSTOPPABLE MALE 
 
School administrators place the onus on girls to cover up their bodies, because 
“boys simply cannot help themselves,” “boys cannot resist the temptation,” or “boys 
simply cannot resist the urge” to make unwanted sexual advances. These dangerous 
claims take the “boys will be boys” trope a step further by claiming an instinctual, 
primal urge within boys to sexualize girls absolves boys from responsibility when 
they do so.139  
Absolving boys from responsibility, or at least mitigating their culpability, 
finds parallels in criminal sexual assault adjudication as well. Even if a factfinder 
refuses to imply consent to engage in a sexual act from the victim’s provocative 
dress, it may nevertheless mitigate the punishment imposed because it is 
“reasonable” or “understandable” for the perpetrator to behave the way he did given 
the primal irresistibility of the situation. This approach represents a subtle reframing 
of the “perfect victim” myth. Instead of concluding that a scantily clad rape victim 
is less deserving of society’s protection, the factfinder concludes that the rape 
perpetrator is less deserving of society’s condemnation because of his innate primal 
desire to have sexual contact with a scantily clad female.140  
This “primal urge” theory finds currency in another, perhaps less clearly 
analogous set of cases: revoked consent or “post-penetration rape” cases.141 Until 
2003, no state recognized a revocation of consent as valid once a sex act began.142 
In other words, once a consensual act of sexual intercourse began, neither party had 
 
137 Laura Bates, “How School Dress Codes Shame Girls and Perpetuate Rape Culture,” TIME 
(May 22, 2015) (“I walked past another student wearing a shirt depicting two stick figures: 
the male holding down the females [sic] head in his crotch and saying ‘good girls swallow.’ 
Teachers walked right past him and didn’t say a thing.”).  
138 Id. 
139 Linda R. Hirshman, Was There Sex Before Calvin Klein?, 53 Wash. & Lee 929, 937 
(1996) (“Sociobiologists would say that nothing is to be done. Boys will be boys; they will 
rape and pillage and abandon there offspring. . . . Boys will be boys, unless women will be 
slaves.”). 
140 Christine Chambers Goodman, Protecting the Party Girl: A New Approach for Evaluating 
Intoxicated Consent, 2009 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 57, 96 (2009) (“In evaluating the reasonableness 
of expressions of dissent . . . ‘we need to know the baseline of the person to judge when a 
state of affairs is an evil or benefit to them’ to help us decide whether silence should 
constitute consent.”). 
141 See generally Amanda O. Davis, Clarifying the Issue of Consent: The Evolution of Post-
Penetration Rape Law, 34 Stetson L. Rev. 729 (2005). 
142 Erin G. Palmer, Antiquated Notions of Womanhood and the Myth of the Unstoppable 
Male: Why Post-Penetration Rape Cases Should Be a Crime in North Carolina, 82 N.C. L. 
REV. 1258, 1277 (2004) (“[O]n July 25, 2003, [Illinois] became the first state to enact a 
statute expressly making post-penetration rape a crime.”). 
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a legal right to change their mind and stop the act.143 Female victims bringing rape 
charges against men who ignored their post-penetration revocations of consent were 
regularly met with the “uncontrollable male” defense, articulated in In re John Z. 
thusly: 
By essence of the act of sexual intercourse, a male’s primal urge to reproduce 
is aroused. It is therefore unreasonable for a female and the law to expect a male to 
cease having sexual intercourse immediately upon withdrawal of consent. It is only 
natural, fair and just that a male be given a reasonable amount of time to quell his 
primal urge.144 
Citing this “myth of the unstoppable male,” the defendant disclaimed both 
control over and responsibility for his actions, and “denied legal culpability for 
imposing sex on an unwilling partner.”145 This defense claims that men, “by their 
very natures, would be biologically incapable of abiding by a law that required them 
to listen and respond when their partners withdrew consent for sex.”146 While the 
California Supreme Court ultimately ruled against the perpetrator, it left the 
“unstoppable male” myth intact, holding instead that the perpetrator had “ample 
time” to quell his desires.147 Fortunately, following the outcry from this case and a 
growing recognition of the need to fix this “crazy loophole,” states began enacting 
statutes expressly making post-penetration rape a crime.148 Currently, only North 
Carolina (the home state of this Author) fails to recognize the validity of post-
penetration consent revocation.149  
Admittedly, a boy leering at a girl’s body in school after being told to stop 
differs significantly from a man continuing to have sex with a woman after being 
told to stop. But the myth justifying diminished culpability in both situations is 
similar: boys and men have primal urges to sexualize and have sex with girls and 
women, they biologically cannot be expected to resist these urges, and thus legally 
they will not be held fully responsible for their nonconsensual actions. This male-
 
143 See, e.g., Battle v. State, 414 A.2d 1266, 1268-70 (Md. 1980) (“[I]f the consent is 
withdrawn prior to the act of penetration, then it cannot be said that she has consented to 
sexual intercourse. On the other hand, ordinarily, if she consents prior to penetration and 
withdraws consent following penetration, there is no rape.”). 
144 60 P.3d 183, 184 (Cal. 2003). 
145 Id. at 185. 
146 Id. at 186. 
147 Id. at 187. 
148 Mary Huff, The “New” Withdrawal of Consent Standard in Maryland Rape Law: A Year 
After Baby v. State, 6 AM. U. MODERN AM. 14, 15 (2009) (describing pace of legislative and 
judicial progress across the country); Molly Redden, “‘No doesn’t really mean no’: North 
Carolina law means women can’t revoke consent for sex,” THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 24, 2017) 
(describing North Carolina law “preventing prosecutors from charging” rape in post-
penetration withdrawal of consent cases and state senator Jeff Jackson’s failed efforts to 
introduce legislation to “fix this loophole”). 
149 Redden, supra note __ (quote Sen. Jackson: “North Carolina is the only state in the 
country where no doesn’t really mean no. We have a clear ethical obligation to fix this 
obvious defect in our rape law.”). 
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centric, hereto-normative accommodation is insulting to men and does incredible 
harm to women, and yet finds a home in school policies governing our children.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Stephanie Hughes, the Woodford High student pictured at the beginning of this 
Essay, missed two hours’ of instruction waiting in the principal’s office for her 
mother to leave work and bring clothing to cover her exposed collarbone.150 Her 
mother gave her the scarf pictured below, which brought Stephanie into compliance 
with the school’s dress code151: 
 
 
However, the principal deemed the scarf “inappropriate” attire for school and 
sent Stephanie home for the rest of the day.152 This episode led to widespread 
protests at the school, eventually culminating in the creation of a documentary by 
one of Stephanie’s classmates entitled Shame: A Documentary on School Dress 
Code.153 The outcry over Woodford High’s policies, and the documentary itself, 
helped place greater pressure on public schools across the country to revisit existing 
dress code policies. Yet the prevalence and problematic messaging of these 
modesty-based dress codes persist today. 
This Essay presents a descriptive parallel between these two worlds – the 
schoolhouse and the courthouse – and a normative reflection on the corrosive 
 
150 Ashley Lewis, “Kentucky high school students, parents fight strict dress code that requires 
girls to cover collarbone,” N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 17, 2015), available at 
https://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/female-student-reprimanded-showing-
collarbone-article-1.2328582.  
151 Id.  
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
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impacts of the messaging sent in each world when we obsess over the sexual nature 
of a woman’s clothing. It does not provide any empirical data, or even anecdotal 
proof, of a direct link between increasingly sexualized school dress codes and rape 
victim credibility discounts in criminal law. That research, to the extent it is possible 
to conduct, would represent a welcome and helpful next step in this discussion. Until 
then, I hope these short remarks provide a useful lens through which to critically 
examine our continued desire to police but failure to protect girls’ and women’s 
bodies.  
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